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	What	 can	 make	 storytelling	 “evil”	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	storytelling	leads	to	accepting	a	view	for	no	good	reason,	thus	allowing	 ill-reasoned	 action?	 I	 mean	 the	 storytelling	 can	 be	argumentatively	evil,	not	trivially	that	(e.g.)	the	overt	speeches	of	characters	can	include	bad	arguments.	My	thesis	is	that	for	fictional	narratives,	 the	 shorter	 the	narrative,	 the	greater	 the	potential	 for	 argumentative	 evil.	 In	 other	 argumentative	contexts,	 length	 generally	 appears	 to	 make	 no	 comparable	difference.		 KEYWORDS:	 advertisements,	 anecdotal	 arguments,	believability,	 fables,	 narrative	 argument,	 parables,	 thought	experiments,	transcendental	argument,	truth	in	fiction			1.	INTRODUCTION		What	can	make	storytelling	“evil”	in	the	sense	that	the	storytelling	leads	to	 accepting	 a	 view	 or	message	 for	 no	 good	 reason,	 thus	 allowing	 ill-reasoned	action?	The	general	idea	that	storytelling	can	have	pernicious	effects	 on	 practical	 reasoning	 goes	 back,	 of	 course,	 at	 least	 as	 far	 as	Plato.	My	point	 is	 that	 the	storytelling	can	be	argumentatively	evil,	not	trivially	 that	 (e.g.)	 the	 overt	 speeches	 of	 characters	 can	 include	 bad	arguments.	 The	 storytelling	 can	 be	 argumentatively	 evil	 in	 that	 it	purveys	 false	 premises,	 or	 purveys	 reasoning	 that	 is	 formally	 or	informally	 fallacious.	 The	main	 thesis	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 that	 there	 is	 an	aspect	 involving	 the	 very	 form	 of	 fictional	 narratives,	 namely,	 their	length,	 that	 can	 distinctively	 allow	 a	 narrative	 to	 be	 evil	 in	 the	 sense	indicated.	As	 a	 rule,	 the	 shorter	 the	 fictional	narrative,	 the	 greater	 the	potential	 for	 argumentative	 evil.	 Here,	 the	 notion	 of	 length	 is	 to	 be	understood	such	that	 it	 is	generally	a	proxy	 for	more	abstract	 features	such	 as	 how	 complex	 and	 nuanced	 the	 piece	 is.	 In	 argumentative	contexts	other	than	those	involving	fictional	narrative,	length	generally	
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616	appears	 to	 make	 no	 comparable	 difference.	 This	 feature	 would	 put	fictional	 narrative	 arguments	 in	 a	 special	 class	 beyond	 what	 is	determined	by	obvious	features,	such	as	the	definitional	fact	that	they	in	some	 way(s)	 collapse	 two	 of	 the	 four	 traditional	 types	 of	 discourse:	exposition,	 description,	 narration,	 and	 argument.	 The	 nonobvious	features	 that	 distinguish	 this	 class	 have	 been	 a	 source	 of	 puzzlement	and	inquiry	(e.g.,	Schultz,	1979;	Plumer,	2011;	Govier	&	Ayers,	2012).			2.	SHORT	FICTIONS		If	 you	place	 the	various	major	kinds	of	 fictional	narratives	on	a	 length	continuum,	on	one	end	you	get	advertisements	and	jokes	that	include	a	brief	fabricated	story,	as	well	as	short	fables	and	parables;	novels	lie	at	the	 other	 end,	 with	 short	 stories,	 films,	 and	 plays	 somewhere	 more	toward	 the	 middle.	 Storytelling	 poems	 can	 lie	 anywhere	 on	 the	continuum,	 but	 they	 seem	 assimilable	 to	 other	 kinds	 of	 fictional	narratives	with	respect	to	argumentative	potential.	However,	narrative	“thought	experiments”	appear	to	be	in	a	class	by	themselves,	as	we	will	see.	 A	 piece	 anywhere	 on	 the	 continuum	 is	 a	 “story”	 in	 the	minimalist	sense	of	being	a	perspectival	or	selective	depiction	of	at	least	two	 temporally-related	 events	 in	 a	 further	 nonlogical	 (e.g.,	 causal)	relationship	 (adapted	 from	Lamarque,	2004;	cf.,	 e.g.,	Walton,	2012,	pp.	191	&	199).	A	piece	 anywhere	on	 the	 continuum	 is	 fictional	 in	 that	 at	least	 some	 of	 what	 is	 depicted	 is	 not	 supposed	 to	 be	 true.	 A	 piece	anywhere	on	the	continuum	can	have	affective	and	persuasive	force.	So,	what	 distinguishes	 pieces	 on	 the	 short	 end	 of	 the	 stick,	 so	 to	 speak	(other	than	their	word	count)?	One	 feature	 that	 such	 ads,	 jokes,	 fables,	 and	 parables	 have	 in	common	 is	 that	 they	have	a	point	or	message,	seemingly	by	definition,	and	so	are	in	that	(possibly	weak)	way	argumentative.	Indeed,	it	is	hard	to	see	what	their	raison	d’etre	would	be	without	a	point	or	message,	in	contrast	 to	 longer	 fictional	 narratives,	 which	 instead	 typically	 have	substantial	 plot	 and	 character	 development,	 and	 fine	 descriptions	(“word	paintings”)	of	the	natural	or	artificial	world.	Ads	try	to	influence	you	to	buy	or	do	something.	To	“get”	a	joke	is	to	grasp	its	point.	There	is	a	bit	of	contention	about	this	regarding	fables	and	parables,	but	it	only	concerns	whether	the	point	or	message	has	to	be	implicit.	For	example,	Govier	 &	 Ayers	 appear	 to	 be	 inclined	 to	 accept	 the	 view	 that	 in	 the	western	 tradition,	 “a	 fable	 comes	 with	 ‘the	 moral	 of	 the	 story’	 stated	right	 there,	whereas…a	parable	must	have	an	 implicit	message”	 (2012,	p.	173).	In	contrast,	Hunt	maintains,	“both	historically	and	conceptually,	that	 explicitly	 stating	 the	 point	 of	 a	 story	 is	 not	 necessary	 to	 a	 story’s	
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617	being	a	fable”	(2009,	p.	381).	However,	it	does	seem	that	longer	fictional	narratives	need	not	have	a	point,	whether	implicit	or	explicit—consider	the	recent	U.S.	television	series	Lost	and	perhaps	James	Joyce’s	Ulysses—and	even	that	 they	are	 less	 literary	 if	 they	do	have	a	point	or	moralize	(cf.	Hunt,	p.	382).	“A	novel	or	theater	piece	need	not	reach	a	conclusion	or	 even	 seem	 to	 approach	 one”	 (Velleman,	 2003,	 p.	 10).	 Currie	 (2010,	pp.	34-35)	offers	a	kind	of	explanation	of	this	difference.	He	says	that	if	you	 are	 distinguishing	 narrative	 from	 something	 on	 the	 order	 of	mathematical	 physics,	 no	 doubt	 parables	 and	 the	 like	 count	 as	narratives.	 But	 if	 you	have	 in	mind	 something	 on	 the	 order	 of	 a	 short	story	or	novel,	you	might	distinguish	narratives	 from	parables	and	the	like,	because	the	latter	“have	generalizing	tendencies	that	do	not	fit	well	with	the	particularizing,	sequential	aspirations	of	narrative.”	Before	developing	 some	of	 these	 ideas	 further,	 let	us	put	 some	illustrations	on	the	table.	Here	is	an	example	of	an	ad	(from	television):		
Copy	 and	 gist	 from:	 Think	 small.	 The	 story	 of	 those	 Vehicle	
ads,	 by	 Frank	 Rowsome,	 Jr.,	 1970,	 pg.	 116-7.	 The	 company	name	 is	 changed	 here.	 Visual	 description	 more	 or	 less	 by:	Shazam	(Suzanne).	___________________________________________________		[Dark	 snowy	 early	 morning	 in	 country,	 view	 is	 of	 outdoors	through	 the	 front	 windshield	 of	 a	 car.	 The	 car's	 headlights	illuminate	 the	 falling	 snow,	 and	 the	 drifts	 of	 it,	 along	 the	untracked,	 winding,	 uphill	 way,	 and	 you	 can	 see,	 in	 passing,	snow	laden	pine	and	fir	branches,	bent	under	the	weight	of	the	snow.	 The	 only	 sound	 throughout:	 the	 purring	 of	 the	 car's	engine.	This	trip	takes	some	time.]		[Then	 the	 headlights	 hit	 and	 pass	 a…building,	 the	 driver	turning	 the	 car	by	 it.	The	 car	 gets	parked:	 the	headlights	 are	turned	 off.	 A	 big	 door	 of	 the	 building	 soon	 opens	 and	 a	powerful	 snowplow	 rolls	 past	 our	 view	 as	 the	 ANNOUNCER	begins.]		ANNOUNCER	Have	 you	 ever	 wondered	 how	 the	 man	 who	 drives	 the	snowplow	drives	to	the	snowplow?	This	one	drives	a	Vehicle.	So	you	can	stop	wondering.	_____________________________________________________		Note:	This	commercial	was	so	popular	in	Florida	and	Southern	California	that	some	stations	played	it	over	and	over	again	due	to	audience	requests.	
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618	(http://reocities.com/tvtranscripts/comm/commcar.htm;	 accessed	 on	 9	Feb.	2015).	Here	is	an	example	of	a	fable	(from	Aesop):		 The	Eagle	and	the	Arrow	An	Eagle	was	soaring	through	the	air	when	suddenly	it	heard	the	whizz	of	an	Arrow,	and	felt	itself	wounded	to	death.	Slowly	it	fluttered	down	to	the	earth,	with	its	life-blood	pouring	out	of	it.	 Looking	 down	 upon	 the	 Arrow	 with	 which	 it	 had	 been	pierced,	 it	 found	 that	 the	 shaft	 of	 the	 Arrow	 had	 been	feathered	 with	 one	 of	 its	 own	 plumes.	 “Alas!”	 it	 cried,	 as	 it	died,	 “we	 often	 give	 our	 enemies	 the	 means	 for	 our	 own	destruction.”		(http://www.aesopfables.com/cgi/aesop1.cgi?1&TheEagleandtheArrow2;	accessed	on	15	Feb.	2015).	And	finally,	a	Ramakrishna	parable:		 WHAT	YOU	ARE	AFTER,	IS	WITHIN	YOURSELF	A	MAN	wanted	 a	 smoke.	 He	went	 to	 a	 neighbour's	 house	 to	light	his	charcoal.	 It	was	the	dead	of	night	and	the	household	was	asleep.	After	he	had	knocked	a	great	deal,	someone	came	down	 to	open	 the	door.	At	 sight	of	 the	man	he	asked,	 “Hello!	What’s	 the	matter?”	 The	man	 replied,	 “Can't	 you	 guess?	 You	know	how	fond	I	am	of	smoking.	I	have	come	here	to	light	my	charcoal.”	 The	 neighbour	 said,	 “Ha!	 Ha!	 You	 are	 a	 fine	 man	indeed!	You	took	the	trouble	to	come	and	do	all	this	knocking	at	the	door!	Why,	you	have	a	lighted	lantern	in	your	hand!”	What	 a	 man	 seeks	 is	 very	 near	 him.	 Still	 he	 wanders	 about	from	place	to	place.		(p.	350	of	a	PDF	book,	Tales	and	Parables	of	Sri	Ramakrishna,	at:	
http://www.archive.org/details/TalesAndParablesOfSriRamakrishna;	accessed	on	9	Feb.	2015.)	Velleman	 (2003)	 develops	 the	 minimalist	 sense	 of	 a	 story	 or	narrative	 mentioned	 above	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 it	 leads	 to	 one	explanation	 of	 how	 storytelling	 can	 be	 argumentatively	 evil.	 As	 a	necessary	condition	for	being	a	story,	he	adds:	“reliably	producing	in	the	audience	 some	 emotional	 resolution”	 (p.	 7,	 cf.	 17).	 Some	 examples	 he	gives	of	such	resolution	are	anxiety	relieved,	hope	dashed,	and	laughter	(for	jokes)	(p.	7).		He	uses	this	theoretical	addition	to	good	effect	(pp.	3-4)	to	explain	how	Aristotle’s	case	of	Mitys	at	Argos	can	be	regarded	as	a	story,	 even	 though	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 events	 is	 not	 causal.	Mitys	was	murdered.	Later,	while	attending	a	“public	spectacle,”	Mitys’	murderer	was	killed	when	a	 statue	of	Mitys	happened	 to	 fall	down	on	him	 (Poetics	 9.1452).	 	 Aristotle	 struggled	 to	 elucidate	 how	 this	 case	
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619	could	 be	 a	 story;	 Velleman	 proposes	 that	 it	 is	 notably	 because	 “the	sequence	of	events	completes	an	emotional	cadence	in	the	audience”	of	“indignation	gratified.”	Velleman	argues	that	the	trouble	is	that	through	experiencing	 a	 story’s	 emotional	 resolution,	 events	 become	understandable	 to	 an	 audience	 not	 through	 assimilation	 to	 “familiar	patterns	 of	 how	 things	 happen,	 but	 rather	 to	 familiar	 patterns	 of	 how	
things	 feel”	(p.	19).	The	 latter,	subjective	understanding	can	easily	give	us	a	false	sense	of	objective	understanding,	so	skepticism	about	what	a	story	claims	or	about	its	message	might	be	mistakenly	dispelled.	Hence,	“telling	a	story	is	often	a	means	to	being	believed	for	no	good	reason”	(p.	22),	thereby	introducing	argumentative	evil.	Velleman’s	 theory	 appears	 to	 apply	 nicely	 to	 the	 examples	quoted	 above.	 Certainly,	 at	 least	 curiosity	 satisfied	 plays	 a	 role	 in	 the	vivid	 “Vehicle”	 commercial	 by	 the	 time	 the	 announcer’s	 voiceover	 is	reached	 and	 suggests	 a	 generalization.	The	Aesop	 fable	 closes	with	 an	explanation/generalization	that	is	a	surprise	ending	to	a	 life-and-death	tale.	 The	 Ramakrishna	 parable	 involves	 a	 breathtaking	 generalization	leap,	 as	 well	 as	 some	 humor.	 However,	 it	 is	 not	 at	 all	 clear	 that	 the	theory	applies	to	longer	literary	genres	where	the	piece	does	not	have	a	succinct	point,	message,	moral,	or	conclusion—for	these	are	what	pack	the	 punch	 or	 drive	 the	 “emotional	 resolution.”	 	 One	 may	 of	 course	engage	emotionally	with	the	meaning	of	a	piece	of	substantial	literature	such	as	a	play	or	novel,	but	to	the	extent	that	its	meaning	is	complex	or	nuanced,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 there	 will	 be	 any	 definitive—let	 alone	global—emotional	resolution	(hence	there	may	be	a	sequel	that	simply	continues	the	story).	About	such	genres	Velleman	says	“they	tend	to	be	described	 as	 genres	 of	 narrative	 by	 extension”	 (p.	 17;	 cf.	 10),	 but	 it	 is	more	 plausible	 to	 hold	 that	 as	 a	 theory	 of	 all	 narrative,	 his	 theory	overreaches.	If	anything,	it	is	the	shortest	genres	that	are	narratives	by	extension,	as	Currie	suggests	above.	So,	I	think	we	see	here	one	way	in	which	shorter	narratives	have	a	greater	potential	for	argumentative	evil	than	longer	ones.	In	 his	 discussion,	 Velleman	 does	 not	 distinguish	 between	fictional	 and	 nonfictional	 narration,	 but	 on	 his	 own	 theory	 you	would	think	 that	 the	 potential	 for	 argumentative	 evil	 is	 less	 for	 nonfictional	narration	 since	 by	 definition	 it	 aims	 at	 veracity	 or	 telling	 how	 things	
actually	 happened.	 The	 proper	 purpose	 of	 any	 nonfictional	 narrative	argument	 is	 to	 be	 sound	 in	 the	 respect	 of	 having	 true	 premises,	 in	contrast	to	the	generalizing	ad,	fable,	and	parable	fictions	quoted	above,	for	example.					
Gilbert	Plumer		
	
620	3.	BELIEVABILITY			On	 the	 continuum	 of	 fictional	 narrative,	 if	 you	 move	 in	 the	 direction	from	 ads	 to	 novels,	 an	 interesting	 feature	 seems	 to	 be	 that—not	immediately	 but	 somewhere	 fairly	 early	 on—believability	 becomes	 a	central	criterion	of	assessment.	 Is	 the	piece	successful	 “make-believe”?	This	 question	 hardly	 pertains	 to	 shorter	 fictional	 narratives;	 it	 is	 not	really	 the	 “game”	 in	 play	 or	 an	 appropriate	 standard	 to	 apply.	 Rather,	such	 narratives	 aim	 at	 being	 charming	 or	 arresting,	 and	 especially	 at	being	moving	through	the	emotional	resolution	packed	by	their	point	or	message.	 But	 whatever	 they	 aim	 at,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 question	 of	believability	 must	 be	 bracketed	 or	 suspended	 for	 shorter	 fictional	narratives	essentially	because	there	is	too	little	room	provided	in	such	a	piece	to	adequately	test	out	the	hypothesis	that	it	is	believable.	I	 don’t	mean	 “believability”	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 artifices	 of	magic	such	 as	 talking	 animals	 or	 objects,	 as	 are	 common	 in	 fables,	 would	preclude	 it.	 For	 short	 genres,	 these	 are	 established	 conventions	 of	expedience	 and	 other	 purposes	 (see	 Olmos,	 2014);	 there	 is	 no	presumption	that	the	author	should	even	acknowledge	deviations	from	accepted	 science,	 let	 alone	 try	 to	 explain	 or	 invent	 any	 underlying	physics.	 In	 contrast,	 there	 is	 this	 presumption	 for	 extended	 science	fiction	 or	 fantasy	 narratives,	 and	 if	 they	 do	 not	 conform	 to	 our	 most	fundamental	 shared	 assumptions	 about	 physical	 reality,	 their	believability	 in	 the	 intended	 sense	 is	 indeed	 called	 into	 question	 (a	possible	example	 is	H.	P.	Lovecraft’s	novella	The	Call	of	Cthulhu).	More	generally,	believability	seems	to	be	determined	mostly	by	what	can	be	called	the	“internal”	and	“external”	coherence	of	the	event	complex	of	an	extended	 fictional	 narrative.	 I	 take	 Schultz	 (1979,	 p.	 233)	 to	 be	succinctly	 explicating	 internal	 coherence	 where	 he	 says:	 “the	 events	must	be	motivated	in	terms	of	one	another…either	one	event	is	a	causal	(or	 otherwise	 probable)	 consequence	 of	 another;	 or	 some	 event’s	happening	 provides	 a	 character	 with	 a	 reason	 or	 motive	 for	 making	another	event	happen”	(cf.,	e.g.,	Cebik,	1971,	p.	16).	The	narrative	is	not	believable	if	in	it	things	keep	happening	for	no	apparent	reason	or	in	a	way	 that	 is	 inadequately	 connected	 with	 the	 other	 events	 in	 the	narrative.	Certainly,	 this	applies	 to	some	degree	 to	William	Burroughs’	
Naked	Lunch,	for	example.	Such	“real”	connections	of	efficient,	final,	and	material	 causes	 (using	 Aristotle’s	 terminology),	 and	 any	 probabilistic	counterparts,	are	required.	You	could	not	construct	a	coherent	novel	or	play	from	a	random	series	of	events	or	even	from	bolts	of	cosmic	justice,	like	the	one	we	saw	in	the	pithy	Mitys	story.				But	 even	 if	 the	 events	 of	 a	 narrative	 are	 fully	 connected,	 the	narrative	may	still	not	be	believable	because	 those	connections	do	not	
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621	cohere	 well	 with	 our	 widely	 shared	 basic	 assumptions	 about	 how	human	psychology	and	society	not	only	actually,	but	necessarily	work.	This	 is	 the	main	component	of	external	coherence.	The	believability	of	an	extended	fictional	narrative	requires	that	its	plot,	characters,	and	fine	description	 be	 developed	 in	 ways	 that	 generally	 conform	 to	 our	fundamental	 shared	 assumptions	 about	 human	 nature	 (Max	Beerbohm’s	Zuleika	Dobson	seems	to	fully	recognize	this	requirement	in	its	 intentional	 violation	 of	 it1),	 and	 secondarily,	 about	 physical	 nature	(as	noted).	Of	 course,	 the	 believability	 of	 an	 extended	 fictional	 narrative	does	 not	 involve	 believing	 that	 its	 event	 complex	 is	 true;	 rather,	 it	involves	 believing	 that	 the	 event	 complex	 could	 have	 been	 true	 in	 a	strong	sense	of	“could”—much	stronger,	for	example,	than	that	of	mere	logical	possibility.	The	possibilities	 that	 the	narrative	evokes,	 if	 it	 is	 to	be	 believable,	must	 be	 grounded	 in	 “real”	 event	 relations	 and	 in	 basic	perceived	 facts	 of	 human	 nature.	 And	 as	 the	 narrative	 progresses	 in	developing	a	 theme(s),	 the	possibilities	 evoked	must	be	 salient	 in	 that	they	 are	 thematically	 relevant.	 But	 the	 shorter	 the	 fictional	 narrative,	the	 closer	 the	 possibilities	 come	 to	 being	mere	 logical	 possibilities.	 In	the	 shortest,	 there	 is	 almost	no	plot	or	 character	development,	 or	 fine	description.	 So	 there	 is	 no	 way	 to	 tell	 if	 the	 narrative	 is	 significantly	internally	or	externally	coherent.2	It	 seems	 that	 generally,	 believability	 is	 experienced	 by	 the	audience	 as	 a	 simple,	 unanalyzed	 datum	 or	measure	 of	 the	 narrative,	continuously	updated	as	the	audience	progresses	through	the	work	and	imaginatively	 engages	with	 it.	 And,	 as	Aristotle	 said	 about	 judging	 the	
																																								 																					1Consider	 this	 description	 of	 the	 novel:	 “…an	 ironic	 fantasy	 of	 Oxford	undergraduate	 life	a	100	or	so	years	ago.	The	characters’	speech	and	motives	are	absurd	in	about	equal	measure,	but	one	would	be	missing	the	point	to	hold	this	 against	 the	 work.	 For	 the	 author	 is	 plainly	 not	 seeking	 psychological	verisimilitude…The	 interest	 of	 the	work	 is	 essentially	 that	 of	 a	 tour	 de	 force:	how	 long	 can	 the	 author	 retain	 our	 interest	 while	 so	 consciously	 eschewing	psychological	plausibility?”	(Currie,	2012,	p.	29	&	n.	7).	2Being	believable	does	not	mean	that	something	is	on	its	way	to	being	believed,	for	that	path	is	never	taken	for	something	you	know	to	be	fiction.	With	respect	to	 fictional	stories,	 internal	and	external	coherence	constitute	more	or	 less	all	there	 is	 to	believability;	with	respect	to	nonfictional	stories,	belief	may	be	the	only	thing	there	is	to	believability	(possibility	is	logically	implied	by	actuality).	Hence,	 it	 is	 problematic	 to	 analyze	 “believability”	 (“credibility,”	 “plausibility”)	indifferently	as	it	pertains	to	these	two	story	domains,	as	do	Fisher	(1987)	and	Olmos	(2013;	2015).	
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622	happiness	of	a	person,	you	do	not	know	for	sure	about	believability	until	you	reach	the	narrative’s	end.	Just	 as	 we	 can	 always	 ask	 about	 an	 extended	 fictional	narrative—is	it	successful	“make-believe”?—it	seems	we	can	ask	about	any	 believable	 plot/character	 development	 complex—what	 principles	or	 generalizations	would	 have	 to	 operate	 in	 the	 real	world	 (of	 human	psychology,	 action,	 and	 society),	 as	 we	 conceive	 it,	 in	 order	 for	 the	fictional	complex	to	be	believable?	With	this	question,	a	transcendental	argument	 scheme	 is	 generated	 that	 is	 “ambitious”	 (vs.	 “modest”—see	Stern,	2007)	if	we	presume	that	our	fundamental	shared	conceptions	of	human	nature	are	generally	true:		(1)	This	story	is	believable.	(2)	This	 story	 is	believable	only	 if	 such	and	such	principles	operate	 in	the	real	world	(of	human	psychology,	action,	and	society).	(3)	Therefore,	such	and	such	principles	operate	in	the	real	world.	I	 have	 argued	 elsewhere	 (2015),	 on	 both	 philosophical	 and	 empirical	grounds,	that	our	fundamental	shared	conceptions	of	human	nature	are	generally	 true.	 Let	me	 just	 summarize	 the	 philosophical	 reasons	 here.	No	 doubt	 in	 certain	 cases	 I	 may	 find	 a	 work	 of	 extended	 fictional	narration	believable,	whereas	you	do	not.	But	 it	seems	that	there	 is	no	wholesale	 relativity	 of	 believability	 because	 there	 is	 such	 a	 thing	 as	human	 nature,	 which	 we	 all	 share	 and	 to	 which	 we	 have	 significant	introspective	 or	 “privileged”	 access,	 or	 at	 least	 psychological	attunement.3	The	believable	narrative	taps	into	and	relies	on	these	facts,	bringing	operant	principles	to	the	fore—which	allows	it	to	function	as	a	perfectly	 effective	 psychological	 “trigger”	 (cf.	 Gaiman,	 2015,	 p.	 xiii).	 If	this	general	idea	were	not	true,	then	it	would	be	pretty	inexplicable	that	there	is	widespread	agreement	about	which	novels	are	good	novels,	for	example.	 Being	 believable	 is	 a	 central	 necessary	 condition	 for	 an	extended	 fictional	 narrative	 to	 be	 good.	 So	 in	 the	 transcendental	argument,	 the	 leap	 from	 the	 inner	 to	 outer	 worlds	 is	 limited	 and	facilitated.	The	leap	is	from	our	psychological	experience	of	believability	of	 the	 narrative	 to	 the	 real	 world	 of	 human	 psychology,	 action,	 and	society—which	 is	 the	 primary	 subject	matter	 of	 all	 extended	 fictional																																									 																					3A	 recent	 influential	 article	 on	 introspection	 (Schwitzgebel,	 2008)	poses	 little	threat	to	my	points	here	concerning	human	nature	and	its	operant	principles,	because	the	focus	of	the	article	is	on	the	untrustworthiness	of	introspection	of	immediate	 conscious	 experience.	Differences	 among	 readers	 in	 the	 perceived	believability	 of	 a	 novel	 may	 be	 largely	 attributable	 to	 relatively	 extraneous	factors,	 such	 as	 the	 setting	 of	 the	 novel.	 For	 example,	 if	 I	 could	 get	 past	 the	fantastic	 details	 of	 Tolkein’s	 trilogy,	 I	 think	 I	 could	 better	 appreciate	 these	novels	as	implicating	truths	of	human	nature.		
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623	narratives.	This	subject	matter	 is	basically	human	nature,	 I	 take	it.	The	inner	and	outer	worlds	of	 the	narrative	argument	are	 significantly	 the	same;		it	is	not	as	if	the	worlds	are	distinct	as,	for	example,	thought	and	a	brain	 in	 a	 vat,	 as	 in	 Putnam’s	 memorable	 transcendental	 argument	(1981,	 Ch.	 1).	 And,	 as	 Nagel	 (1979,	 Ch.	 12)	 forcefully	 argued,	 because	after	all	we	are	human,	we	know	what	it	is	like	to	be	human	in	a	way	we	do	not	know	what	it	is	like	to	have	a	different	nature,	such	as	a	bat’s	(and	perceive	the	world	primarily	through	echolocation,	be	capable	of	flying,	etc.).	 Such	 philosophical	 considerations	 indicate	 that	 the	 principles	evoked	 in	 the	 narrative	 argument	 resonate	 in	 believability	 largely	because	they	are	true	of	human	nature.		As	we’ve	 seen,	 storytelling	 ads	 and	 jokes,	 and	 short	 fables	 and	parables,	 may	 be	 charming	 or	 arresting.	 But	 this	 affective	 appeal	especially	 allows	 them	 also	 to	 be	 seductive	 and	 possibly	 misleading	since	they	have	a	point	or	message.	One	can	be	seduced	into	accepting	the	message	for	no	good	reason	and	acting	on	it,	 for	instance,	buying	a	“Vehicle”	 even	 though	 you	 live	 in	 Florida.	 My	 key	 point	 is	 that	 such	perniciousness	 does	 not	 apply	 to	 longer	 fictional	 narratives	 that	 are	believable,	 insofar	 as	 believability	 implicates	 truths	 of	 human	 nature,	even	 though	 longer	 fictional	narratives	 in	some	ways	have	as	much	or	more	 affective	 appeal.	 Only	 fictional	 narratives	 that	 are	 believable	exhibit	 (indirectly,	 and	 as	 wholes)	 the	 distinctive	 narrative	 argument	form	outlined	above.	This	form	is	not	only	valid	but	is	in	a	certain	way	probabilistically	 sound.	 (1)-(3)	 constitute	 a	 schematic	 meta-level	representation	 of	 the	 (transcendental)	 argument	 of	 a	 believable	 story,	which,	 at	 the	 object	 level,	 is	 only	 indirectly	 expressed	by	 the	 story.	At	the	object	level,	given	that	premise	(1)	is	true	and	that	our	fundamental	shared	conceptions	of	human	nature	are	generally	true,	 the	conclusion	(3)	 is	unlikely	 to	be	mistaken.	However,	at	 the	 interpretive	meta-level,	perhaps	 especially	 where	 the	 literary	 critic	 attempts	 to	 directly	 state	which	 specific	 truths	 of	 human	 nature	 are	 implicated	 (i.e.,	 flesh	 out	premise	 (2)),	 no	 doubt	 errors	 may	 be	 committed.	 Nevertheless,	 this	interpretive	enterprise	is	worth	pursuing,	for	it	articulates,	insofar	as	it	is	successful,	the	narrative’s	contribution	to	human	knowledge.	Through	the	transcendental	argument	and	the	“work”	of	progressing	through	the	narrative,	 true	assumptions	or	conceptions	held	by	the	audience	about	human	nature	become	justified	true	beliefs.		Thus,	 as	 compared	 to	 shorter	 fictional	 narratives,	 longer	 ones	that	 are	 believable	 have	 less	 potential	 for	 argumentative	 evil	 in	 the	respect	 that	 their	 believability	 generates	 a	 good	 transcendental	argument.	 This	 is	 not	 to	 deny	 that	 there	 are	 other	 respects	 in	 which	extended	 fictional	 narratives,	 whether	 believable	 or	 not,	 may	 be	 evil.	Some	 of	 these	 respects	 have	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 argument,	 and	 some	
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624	arise	because	the	overt	speeches	of	characters	include	bad	arguments—which,	recall,	 is	not	a	concern	of	this	paper.	Consider	the	novels	of	The	Marquis	 de	 Sade	 or	 Ayn	 Rand.	 But	 it	 is	 not	 my	 intention	 that	 my	believability	 cum	 transcendental-argument	 theory	 be	 immune	 to	possible	counterexample.	Take,	for	instance,	the	1940	Nazi	propaganda	film	Jud	Süß	or	even	perhaps	Sinclair	Lewis’	Babbitt.	Both	succeeded	in	turning	large	numbers	against	certain	classes	of	people	(Jews	and	small-town	 businessmen,	 respectively).	 A	 case	 strong	 enough	 to	 raise	questions	 can	 be	made	 that	 these	works	 are	 believable.	 Yet	 there	 are	possible	 answers.	 One	 is	 that	 their	 objectionable	 stances	 themselves	(anti	Semitism,	anti	small-town	businessmen)	are	far	too	specific	to	be	fundamental	principles	of	human	nature,	and	another	is	that	there	is	no	guarantee	 that	 fundamental	 principles	 of	 human	 nature	will	 be	 pretty	(e.g.,	 if	we	have	an	innate	proclivity	to	violence).	My	theory	(if	correct)	would	show	that	a	believable	narrative	must	be	right	about	most	of	the	principles	 it	 depends	 on,	 but	 it	 does	 not	 preclude	 that	 the	 aim	 of	 the	narrative	 nevertheless	 could	 be	 to	 lead	 people	 to	 false	 and	 harmful	conclusions	about	whole	classes	of	people,	albeit	conclusions	that	do	not	rise	 to	 the	 level	 of	 principles.	 Perhaps	 a	 more	 intractable	 kind	 of	criticism	would	be	constituted	by	an	accumulation	of	putative	empirical	counterexamples	 to	 my	 subsidiary	 thesis	 that	 our	 basic	 shared	conceptions	 of	 human	 nature	 are	 generally	 true,	 though	 I	 have	addressed	this	issue	elsewhere	(2015).		In	any	case,	some	of	the	preceding	ideas	have	been	delightfully,	although	 less	 formally,	 expressed	 by	 Doody	 (2009,	 pp.	 155-157).	 It	 is	worth	giving	her	some	room:		 Fiction	 knows	 that	 fable	 packs	 the	 punch,	 has	 the	 charge	 it	wants.	At	the	same	time,	the	prose	fiction	novel	knows	that	the	fable	 lacks	 what	 the	 Novel	 always	 wants	 to	 offer—full	characterization	and	length…	“This	is	all	you	need	to	know,	for	my	point,”	 says	 the	philosopher,	brusquely	 finishing	his	 fable	so	 he	 can	 get	 on	 with	 the	 job.	 “Wait,	 wait,”	 cries	 the	 Novel.	“This	is	the	job!	I	want	to	know	more	and	I	don’t	care	so	much	about	your	point.	For	your	point	might	not	be	true	if	we	knew	more.	 Let	 us	 test	 it	 by	 amplifcatio.”…No	 parable	 is	 safe…We	know	 the	 story	 of	 the	 Prodigal	 Son…	 “But,”	 says	 the	 Novel,	“that’s	a	great	story,	but	 I	want	 to	know	more.	What	was	 the	father	 like?	 Was	 there	 something	 about	 him	 that	 made	 the	second	son	want	to	leave?	Suppose	the	first	son’s	jealousy	had	existed	 for	 a	 long	 time,	not	 just	 at	 the	homecoming.	 Suppose	that	 son	 had	 turned	 the	 father	 against	 his	 brother,	 so	 the	brother	 lit	 out	 and	 sought	 affection	 among	 the	 prostitutes?”	And	 so	 Henry	 Fielding	 writes	 the	 whole	 story	 anew	 in	 Tom	
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Jones,	the	story	of	the	wronged	Prodigious	Son	and	the	father	who	must	in	the	end	seek	forgiveness.		4.	OTHER	(IL)LOGIC	OF	SHORT	FICTIONS		In	 contrast	 to	 believable	 fictions,	 storytelling	 ads,	 jokes,	 fables,	 and	parables,	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 they	 are	 argumentative,	 do	 not	 exhibit	 a	distinctive	narrative	argument	 form,	but	rather	exhibit	standard	 forms	such	 as	 argument	 from	 analogy	 and	 inductive	 generalization.	 At	 least	partly	 because	 of	 the	 heavy	 reliance	 of	 such	 arguments	 on	 affective	appeal	 when	 expressed	 by	 such	 fictional	 narratives,	 unsurprisingly,	Govier	&	Ayers	 (2012,	 p.	 188)	 found	 that	 these	 “arguments	 are	 rarely	cogent,”	and	(echoing	Velleman)	“the	form	and	interest	of	the	story	will	often	 distract	 us	 from	 attempting	 any	 task	 of	 logical	 assessment.”	 For	example,	 they	point	out	 that	 the	parable	above,	What	You	are	After,	 is	Within	 Yourself,	 taken	 as	 an	 argument,	 involves	 “hastily	 generalizing	from	the	highly	specific	situation	of	a	man	wandering	about	in	the	dark,	with	 a	 lighted	 lantern,	 to	 a	 universal	 human	 quest”	 (p.	 178).	 Not	 to	mention,	 let	 us	 not	 forget,	 the	 single	 instance	 on	 which	 the	generalization	is	based	is	fictional.	Similarly,	 the	 conclusion	 in	 The	 Eagle	 and	 the	 Arrow	 that	 “we	often	give	our	enemies	 the	means	 for	our	own	destruction,”	 taking	the	fable	as	an	argument,	is	an	unjustified	leap,	although	it	is	more	guarded.	Understood	 as	 an	 argument,	 the	 fable	 seems	 best	 understood	 as	 an	argument	 from	 analogy.	 Certainly,	 the	 source	 and	 target	 domains	 are	distinct	 but	 parallel4—the	 fabulous	 world	 of	 talking	 and	 reasoning	animals,	 and	 the	 human	 world,	 respectively.	 The	 use	 of	 an	 eagle	 in	particular,	 might	 allude	 to	 a	 human	 type	 or	 stereotype	 (a	 smart	 and	successful	but	overly	trusting	“high-flyer”)	particularly	subject	to	such	a	plight.	 The	 case	 seems	 to	 fit	 Hunt’s	 (2009)	 analysis	 of	 fabulous	arguments	from	analogy:	they	have	a	“first	case/principle/second	case”	structure,	where	the	principle	is	in	Peircean	fashion	“abduced”	from	the	first	case	(the	eagle’s	plight)—the	principle	“is	supported	to	the	extent	that	it	is	a	good	explanation	of	the	first	case.”	The	second	case,	however,	is	 deduced	 from	 the	 principle	 (p.	 373);	 it	 is	 how	 readers	 apply	 the	principle	 “to	 guide	 their	 own	 moral	 conduct	 or	 persuade	 others”	 (p.	379)—as	one	might	think,	“I	better	be	careful	or	there	 is	a	real	chance	that	I	could	inadvertently	help	my	rivals	by…”																																									 																					4For	the	importance	in	drawing	an	analogy	of	having	two	such	domains	and	not	merely	 a	 similarity	 relationship,	 see	 Perelman	 &	 Olbrechts-Tyteca	 (1958,	 p.	502),	Beardsley	(1975,	p.	111),	and	Olmos	(2014).	
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626	 Literally	 and	 technically,	 such	 analyses	 indicating	 the	 specific	illogic	 of	 short	 fictions	 appear	 to	 be	 correct.	 However,	 it	 must	 be	acknowledged	 that	 audiences	 often	 take	 these	 fictions	 to	 be	 merely	suggestive,	and	not	dispositive,	of	their	generalizations	or	explanations.	In	 other	words,	 audiences	 often	 do	 not	 take	 them	 to	 be	 arguments.	 It	nevertheless	 remains	 that	 when	 they	 are	 understood	 as	 arguments,	their	 potential	 for	 argumentative	 evil	 is	 generally	 greater	 than	 for	believable	 fictions.	 And	 this	 potential	 is	 perhaps	 greatest	 for	 children	and	mentally	challenged	adults.				5.	NARRATIVE	THOUGHT	EXPERIMENTS		Thought	 experiments	 are	 designed	 to	 yield	 insight.	 There	 are	 many	kinds	 of	 thought	 experiments.	 In	 perhaps	 the	 simplest	 of	 taxonomies,	Popper	(1959,	p.	443)	identifies	three	uses	of	“imaginary	experiments”;	they	may	be	used	to	illustrate,	support,	or	undermine	a	theory	(what	he	calls	 their	 “heuristic…apologetic…critical”	 uses).	 Thought	 experiments	are	 all	 fictional	 in	 that	 a	 hypothetical	 or	 counterfactual	 situation	 is	visualized	 or	 somehow	 imagined	 in	 experience.	 However,	 in	 many	thought	 experiments,	 storytelling	 or	 narrative	 is	 not	 prominent;	 they	are	 not	 especially	 perspectival	 and	 “particularizing,	 sequential”	depictions	 of	 events.	 Scientific	 thought	 experiments	 are	characteristically	 in	 this	 way	 non-narrative,	 for	 example,	 Galileo’s	famous	Pisa-type	one	where	he	disproves	the	Aristotelian	view	that	the	heavier	 the	 object,	 the	 faster	 it	 falls.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 narrative	thought	 experiments,	 like	 all	 fictional	 narratives,	 are	 ultimately	 about	human	psychology,	action,	and	society.						How	 do	 narrative	 thought	 experiments	 otherwise	 compare	 to	other	fictional	narratives?	Again,	length	appears	to	play	a	critical	role	in	allowing	a	cogent	argument,	but	in	a	different	way.	The	most	successful	narrative	 thought	 experiments	 appear	 to	 present	 an	 extended	 and	relevant	 point-by-point	 analogue	 of	 whatever	 problem	 is	 at	 issue.	Thomson’s	 violinist	 in	 her	 paper	 “A	 Defense	 of	 Abortion”	 (1971)	 is	paradigmatic.	Walton	(2012,	p.	199)	presents	a	convenient	summary	of	her	core	source	and	target	“stories”:			 1.	Person	finds	himself	attached	to	famous	violinist.	2.	Person	had	no	choice	about	this	arrangement.	3.	Having	violinist	attached	is	an	encumbrance	to	person.	4.	Having	violinist	attached	will	hinder	person’s	daily	activities.	5.	Violinist	will	die	if	removed	from	person.		
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627	6.	Violinist	can	only	survive	if	attached	to	person	for	nine	months.	7.	Person	can	make	a	choice	about	removing	violinist…		1.	Woman	who	has	been	raped	finds	herself	pregnant.	2.	Woman	had	no	choice	about	becoming	pregnant.	3.	Being	pregnant	is	an	encumbrance	to	woman.	4.	Being	pregnant	will	hinder	woman’s	daily	activities.	5.	Fetus	will	die	if	removed	from	woman.	6.	Fetus	can	only	survive	if	carried	to	term	of	approximately	nine	months.	7.	Woman	can	make	a	choice	about	removing	fetus.		Thomson	develops	this	analogy	in	different	directions	during	the	course	of	her	paper,	exhibiting	 its	plasticity	and	depth.	 Indeed,	 the	power	and	cogency	of	her	essay	derives	from	its	being	a	good	analogical	argument,	but	 not	 from	 any	 embedded	 fictional	 narrative	 being	 believable	 like	 a	novel,	play,	or	short	story.	As	with	other	such	thought	experiments,	her	violinist	 story	 is	weak	on	both	 external	 and	 internal	 coherence,	 and	 it	would	 be	 astonishing	 if	 it	 were	 even	 intended	 to	 be	 believable.	 As	Peijenburg	 &	 Atkins	 say,	 these	 are	 “outlandish	 stories,”	 	 even	“grotesque”;	 “ones	 like	 Jackson,	 Searle	 and	Putnam	do	not	 eschew	 the	most	bizarre	accounts	of	zombies,	swapped	brains,	exact	Doppelgänger,	and	 famous	 violinists	 who	 are	 plugged	 into	 another	 body”	 (2003,	 p.	305).	 Walton	 too,	 allows	 that	 Thomson’s	 violinist’s	 story	 is	 only	“something	that	could	conceivably	happen”	(2012,	p.	200).		6.	ANECDOTAL	AND	OTHER	NONFICTIONAL	ARGUMENTS		Finally,	 rounding	 out	 the	 consideration	 of	 argumentatively	 evil	storytelling	and	bringing	the	preceding	into	sharper	focus	are	so-called	“anecdotal	 arguments”	 and	 the	 possibilities	 they	 furnish,	 perhaps	notably	to	politicians.	Similarly	to	Johnson	&	Blair	(2006,	p.	70),	Govier	&	Jansen	(2011,	p.	86)	concluded	that	“anecdotal	arguments	are	bound	to	be	logically	and	dialectically	inadequate	if,	as	is	usual,	we	define	them	as	asking	the	audience	to	shift	from	acceptance	of	a	particular	narrative	to	a	general	claim	about	the	world.”	However,	to	the	extent	that	the	term	‘anecdote’	 connotes	 that	 the	 narrative	 is	 nonfictional,	 such	 narratives	differ	 from	 the	 kinds	 of	 narratives	 considered	 thus	 far.	 Unlike	 for	extended	 pieces	 of	 storytelling	 such	 as	 plays	 and	 novels,	 the	 actual	anecdote	in	an	anecdotal	argument	cannot	itself	 furnish	any	argument.	This	 is	 because,	 by	 definition,	 the	 point	 of	 nonfictional	 narration	 (cf.	history	 or	 biography)	 involves	 veracity—sticking	 to	 the	 facts,	 telling	what	happened—so	there	 is	no	theoretical	room	for	the	creativity	that	
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628	is	needed	 to	 invent	what	happens	and	 thereby	construct	an	argument.	Simard-Smith	&	Moldovan,	 for	example,	advance	a	view	of	 “arguments	as	abstract	objects”	that	“understands	arguments	to	be	objects	that	can	be	expressed	in	different	points	of	space	at	the	same	time,	and	that	are	creations	 of	 human	 intellectual	 activity…	 We	 often	 make	 statements	such	as	‘Searle	developed	the	Chinese	room	argument’”	(2011,	pp.	259,	248).		 Not	 surprisingly	 then,	 the	 length	 of	 the	 anecdote	 embedded	 in	an	 argument	 seems	 to	 make	 little	 or	 no	 difference	 to	 the	 cogency	potential	of	the	argument.	Consider	this	case	presented	as	an	anecdote	in	 Hillary	 Clinton’s	 speech	 at	 the	 2008	 US	 Democratic	 National	Convention	endorsing	Barack	Obama	(cited	by	Oldenburg	&	Leff,	2009,	p.	2):		 I	will	 always	 remember	 that	 single	mother	who	had	adopted	two	 kids	 with	 autism.	 She	 didn’t	 have	 any	 health	 insurance;	and	 she	discovered	 that	 she	had	 cancer.	But	 she	 greeted	me,	her	 bald	 head	 painted	with	my	name	 on	 it,	 and	 asked	me	 to	fight	for	health	care	for	her	and	her	children.			I	do	not	see	how	the	cogency	of	Clinton’s	argument	for	rallying	behind	Obama	could	have	been	significantly	affected	one	way	or	another	if	she	had	 presented	 more	 or	 fewer	 details	 of	 the	 unfortunate	 woman’s	situation	(or	presented	more	such	incidents	as	anecdotes,	which	she	in	fact	 did).	 This	 is	 mainly	 because	 we	 would	 still	 not	 be	 told	 how	representative	 the	 case(s)	 cited	 is,	 a	 question	 that	 an	 anecdotal	argument	in	its	usual	form	leaves	unanswered.	So	it	appears	that	for	anecdotal	arguments,	whatever	difference	length	 makes	 to	 the	 potential	 for	 argumentative	 evil,	 it	 is	 not	comparable	 to	 the	 difference	 length	 makes	 for	 fictional	 narrative	arguments.	 Anecdotal	 argument	 seems	 similar	 to	 (nonfictional)	induction	 by	 enumeration	 on	 this	 score.	 No	 number	 of	 enumerated	black	 crows	 identified	 by	 ordinary	 means	 will	 get	 you	 firmly	 to	 the	conclusion	 that	 all	 crows	 are	 black,	 though	 a	 single	 perfectly	representative	one	would.	I	think	nonfictional	arguments	from	analogy	constitute	 an	 exception	 in	 that	 the	 best	 present	 an	 extended	 and	relevant	 point-by-point	 comparison	 between	 things	 in	 distinct	 but	parallel	domains;	if	you	shortchange	this,	there	is	no	end	to	the	potential	for	 argumentative	 evil.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 for	 deductive	 arguments,	there	 is	 simply	 no	 case	 at	 all	 to	 be	made	 that	 length	 could	make	 any	difference	to	their	validity	or	soundness.			
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629	7.	CONCLUSION		In	 summary,	 it	 seems	 that	 there	 are	 reasons	 to	 hold	 that	 in	 fictional	narrative	the	potential	for	argumentative	evil	is	greatest	if	the	approach	taken	 is	 “hit	 and	 run,”	 so	 to	 speak,	 whereas	 in	 other	 argumentative	contexts,	 length	 generally	 appears	 to	make	 no	 comparable	 difference.	This	is	a	feature	that	distinguishes	fictional	narrative	arguments.			ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:	I	am	grateful	to	Jason	Dickenson,	Trudy	Govier,	Lyra	Hostetter,	Kenneth	Olson,	and	Teresa	Plumer	for	helpful	comments	on	an	earlier	draft.			REFERENCES		Beardsley,	 M.	 C.	 (1975).	 Thinking	 straight.	 Principles	 of	 reasoning	 for	 readers	
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		 Commentary	on	Plumer’s		Argumentatively	Evil	Storytelling		 PAULA	OLMOS	
Universidad	Autónoma	de	Madrid	
paula.olmos@uam.es			In	 this	paper,	Gilbert	Plumer	continues,	as	has	been	his	 focus	on	other	recent	contributions,	to	explore	certain	aspects	of	narrative	arguments.	In	this	case,	he	is	explicitly	looking	for	assessment	criteria	and	claims	to	have	found	one	that	applies	to	fiction	narratives:	the	shorter	the	story,	the	 less	 it	will	 justify	 certain	 inferences	 based	 on	 it	 and	 therefore	 the	greater	 the	potential	 for	an	 ill-founded	argumentation	 to	be	presented	through	it.	As	Plumer	uses	the	term,	“short”	 is,	 in	 fact,	short	 for	 schematic,	stylized	and	unrealistic	(as	 in	 fables,	classical	and	oriental,	or	ads)	and	explicitly	opposed	to	the	nuanced,	complex	and	rich-in-detail	weave	and	plot	 of	 (realistic)	 novels	which	 are	 the	 adequate	 basis	 for	 the	 kind	 of	argument	 scheme	 described	 by	 Plumer	 in	 his	 paper	 which	 he	 has	presented	and	used	in	other	contributions.	Namely:		(1)	This	story	is	believable.	(2)	 This	 story	 is	 believable	 only	 if	 such	 and	 such	 principles	operate	 in	 the	 real	 world	 (of	 human	 psychology,	 action,	 and	society).	(3)	 Therefore,	 such	 and	 such	 principles	 operate	 in	 the	 real	world.		At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 paper,	 Plumer	 explores	 other	 kinds	 of	 narratives,	 as	“thought	experiments”	and	“anecdotes”.	The	latter	are	non-fictional	and	are	 usually	 advanced	 as	 premises	 for	 an	 inductive-like	 “anecdotal	argument”,	 based	 on	 the	 assumed	 veracity	 and	 actuality	 (not	 the	believability)	of	 the	anecdote;	and	the	 former,	claims	Plumer,	although	fictions,	 are	neither	usually	 embedded	 in	 a	 kind	of	 argument	 in	which	the	 believability	 of	 the	 story	would	 really	make	 any	 difference	 for	 its	assessment	(this	point	I	think	is	just	suggested	and	would	need	further	exploration).	
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632	 So,	 although	 one	 has	 to	 finish	 the	 paper	 to	 locate	 and	 put	 in	order	all	these	pieces,	Plumer’s	position	is,	in	my	opinion	finally	clear.	It	seems	he	is	contemplating	only	one	possible	argument	scheme	(the	one	he	 originally	 developed	 for	 novels	 in	 his	 2011	 paper:	 “Novels	 as	arguments”)	 for	 which	 he	 takes	 narrative	 fictions	 (leaving	 aside	 just	philosophical	 thought	 experiments)	 would	 be	 candidate	 sources	 or	basis.	 And	 he	 finds	 that	 such	 a	 scheme	 is	 only	 liable	 to	 yield	 sound	arguments	 only	 in	 case	 the	 story	 involved	 has	 certain	 characteristics	and	 actually	 aims	 at	 depicting,	 in	 a	 realistic	manner,	 “the	 real	world”.	This	is	not	possible	if	the	story	is	schematic,	stylized	and	unrealistic,	and	the	subsequent	reconstructed	argument	remains	ill-founded.	For	 me,	 the	 most	 valuable	 contribution	 of	 this	 paper	 is	 this	attempt	 to	 start	 clarifying	 a	 complex	panorama	by	 introducing	 certain	distinctions	 that	 may	 be	 useful	 for	 future	 works.	 Depending	 on	 our	analytic	 aims,	 I	 agree	 that	 taking	 in	 account	 the	 fictive	 or	 factual	character	 of	 the	 stories	 we	 use	 as	 part	 of	 our	 argumentative	 efforts	might	be	 important	 (and	 I	 therefore	assume	 the	 criticism	he	makes	 to	one	of	my	contributions	in	his	paper).		Nevertheless	my	own	view	about	narrative	arguments	(which	I	have	 presented	 in	 other	 recent	 contributions:	 2014,	 2014b,	 2015)	 is	that	 narratives,	 in	 general	 (that	 is,	 fictive	 or	 factual),	 may	 be	 used	 to	construe	very	different	kinds	of	arguments	and	even,	 that	one	and	 the	same	particular	story	(a	classical	fable,	for	example)	might	be	variously	used	as	basis	for	construing	arguments	according	to	different	argument	schemes	in	different	contexts	(some	examples	in	Olmos,	2014b).	So	we	have	 to	 analyze	 and	 assess	 each	 real	 case	 as	 pertaining	 to	 its	 own	argumentative	aims	in	its	own	context.	Moreover,	I	find	Plumer’s	kind	of	“transcendental	argumentative	scheme	 for	 fiction”	 a	 somewhat	 abstract	 model	 that	 probably	 works	better	 for,	 let’s	 say,	 the	 extraction	of	 very	 general	principles	or	usable	warrants	 from	 acknowledged	 complex	 fictions	 than	 as	 a	 genuinely	operational	 form	 of	 argument	 or	 inference	 scheme	 for	 concrete	conclusions.	In	most	real	cases,	it	would	be	part	of	a	more	complex	and,	at	 the	 same	 time,	 more	 concrete	 argumentation	 (of	 a	 practical,	evaluative	 or	 theoretical	 character)	 and	 in	 each	 case	 it	would	 support	our	 final	 conclusions	 in	 a	 somewhat	 receded	way,	 i.e.	 as	 founding	 the	backing	of	the	warrants	of	our	actually	operative	reasons.	That	is	why,	I	think,	it’s	called	“transcendental”:	it	mostly	describes	the	“conditions	of	possibility”	of	the	use	of	certain	kinds	of	arguments	than	describe	those	arguments	themselves.	In	the	particular	case	of	the	three	examples	offered	by	Plumer	as	support	 for	 his	 thesis	 (i.e.:	 the	 shorter	 the	 story,	 the	 greater	 the	potential	for	argumentative	evilness),	Plumer	assumes	that	they	do	not	
Commentary	on	Plumer	
	
	
633	offer	good	enough	reasons	to	support	the	generalizations	they	seem	to	support.	My	point	 is	 that	 it	depends	on	what	you	are	going	to	use	those	
generalizations	for	 (they	might	be	in	need	of	 further	support,	or	not	so	much),	for,	in	most	cases,	one’s	argumentation,	most	typically	a	practical	one	 (taking	 in	 account	 that	 the	 theme	 of	 stories	 is	 usually	 human	action),	 would	 be	 much	 more	 concrete	 and	 referenced	 to	 particular	circumstances	 in	 which	 those	 generalizations	 would	 either	 appear	 as	easily	applicable	or	not.		The	 two	 fables,	 I	 think,	 do	 not	 even	 aim	 at	 “supporting”	 such	generalizations	(as	even	Plumer	admits)	but	only	try	to	“illustrate”	and	“explain”	 them	 (that	 is,	 their	 workings),	 or	 just	 “fix”	 them	 in	 the	imagination.	 Both	 present	 and	 represent,	 in	 fact,	 ideas	 and	 warrants	that	are	already	assumed	as	rather	usable	(prima	facie	good	enough)	in	our	 societies	 for	 advising	 certain	 behaviour	 or	 attitude:	 “what	 a	 man	seeks	 is	very	near	him”,	 “we	often	give	our	enemies	 the	means	 for	our	own	destruction”.	These	 fables	 are	 just	means	 to	 teach	or	 recall	 them.	That	 they	 are	 accepted	 by	 the	 interlocutor	 as	 supporting	 a	 certain	conclusion	will	mainly	depend	on	 the	circumstances	expressed	 in,	 and	the	 further	objectives	of,	 that	particular	 conclusion.	This	 is	 so	because	such	 warrants	 are	 more	 “(usefully)	 applicable	 or	 inapplicable”	 to	particular	 cases	 than	 “true	 or	 false”.	 In	 any	 case,	 the	 fables	 do	 not	exactly	try	to	show	that	they	are	simply	“true”.	In	the	case	of	the	“Vehicle	ad”,	I	agree	that	it	certainly	creates	an	atmosphere,	emotions,	something	to	remember	etc.	but	what	argument	it	is	supposed	to	support	in	a	direct	or	receded	manner	is	yet	something	rather	 open.	 So,	 in	my	 opinion,	 it	 cannot	 be	 yet	 assessed	 as	 better	 or	worst	 founded.	Most	 ads	merely	 support	 the	 “good	 name”	 of	 a	 brand,	using	 different	 reasons	 and	 warrants	 (even	 their	 “good	 taste	 in	publicity”).	They	might	finally	aim	at	advising	a	purchase,	but	the	steps	(argumentative	 steps)	 are	 yet	 too	 many.	 If	 we	 assume	 that	 this	 ad	(through	 the	 story	 told	 in	 it)	 just	 shows	 and	 conveys	 the	 information	that	 the	 makers	 of	 the	 car	 have	 thought	 about	 snow	 conditions	 and	designed	their	vehicle	for	better	facing	them,	and	this	encourages	you	to	visit	 their	 store,	with	 the	memorable	ad	 in	your	mind,	 to	ask	 for	more	details,	I	see	no	evil	in	it.				ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS:	 This	 contribution	 has	 been	made	 possible	 by	funds	 provided	 by	 the	 Spanish	 Ministry	 of	 Economy	 and	Competitiveness:	Research	Project	FFI2011-23125.					
Paula	Olmos	
	
	
634	REFERENCES			Olmos,	 P.	 (2014).	 Narration	 as	 argument.	 In	 D.	 Mohammed	 &	 M.	 Lewiński	(Eds.),	Virtues	of	Argumentation.	Proceedings	of	 the	10th	 International	
Conference	of	the	Ontario	Society	for	the	Study	of	Argumentation	(OSSA),	
22-26	May	2013,	CD	edition.	Windsor:	University	of	Windsor.	Olmos,	P.	(2014b).	Classical	Fables	as	Arguments:	Narration	and	Analogy.	In	H.	Jales	Ribeiro	(Ed.),	Systematic	Approaches	to	Argument	by	Analogy	(pp.	189-208).	Amsterdam:	Springer.	Olmos,	P.	(2015).	Story	Credibility	in	Narrative	Arguments.	In	F.H.	van	Eemeren	&	B.	Garssen,	(Eds.),	Reflections	on	Theoretical	Issues	in	Argumentation	
Theory	(pp.	155-167).	Amsterdam:	Springer.	Plumer,	G.	(2011).	Novels	as	Arguments.	In	van	F.H.	van	Eemeren	et	al.	(Eds.),	
Proceedings	 of	 the	 7th	 Conference	 of	 the	 International	 Society	 for	 the	
Study	of	Argumentation	(ISSA	2010)	 (pp.	1547-1558).	Amsterdam:	Sic	Sat.		
